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Notes and Comments
MARYLAND'S WETLANDS: THE LEGAL QUAGMIRE
"Wetlands" is "a collective term for land-water edge areas and
submerged bottoms" which "usually support extensive growths of
aquatic plants because of either permanent, temporary or intermittent
submersion or inundation. . . ."' The most critical type of wetland
is the swamp or marsh which is rather easily filled and which is
normally not subject to other productive economic use. It is esti-
mated that there are more than 300,000 acres of such swamps and
marshes in Maryland.2 In recent years it has been increasingly rec-
ognized that these areas, in their pristine state, have an enormous
ecological, economic, aesthetic and recreational value3 and that the
continuation of past landfill trends would, by destroying the wetlands,
seriously upset the environmental balance.
Realizing the necessity to protect Maryland's wetland areas and
to limit their further despoilation, the Maryland General Assembly
recently enacted a wetlands statute.4 The new act alleviates a great
number of ambiguities and uncertainties that existed under the for-
mer statutory provisions.5 Moreover, it establishes clear legislative
guidelines for the administration of wetlands and empowers the De-
partment of Natural Resources to promulgate rules and regulations
for the management of these areas.
The initial section of this comment concentrates on the historical
background of the riparian rights provisions of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code and attempts to explain the status of land reclamation under
these provisions. The new Maryland wetlands statute is explored in the
second portion. The final part contains an analysis of some legal
questions which may affect the validity of the new statute. These
include the constitutional problems resulting from uncompensated
takings, the repeal of the former statutory riparian rights sections,
and the applicability of the public trust doctrine to Maryland wetland
areas.
1. ii MARYLAND STATE PLANNING DEP'T, WETLANDS IN MARYLAND - TECH-
NicAL REPORT V-1 (1970).
2. Id. at 11-5. There are also 1.6 million acres of submerged bottom under the
variable depths of the Chesapeake Bay, its tributaries and the Atlantic coast estuaries.
3. Id. at III-1. For discussions of wetland problems in other states, see SAN
FPANcisco BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, SAN FRANCIsco BAY
PLAN (Jan. 1969); Longgood, Saing The Wetlands, in THE LAMP 6 (Fall 1970,
published by Standard Oil Co. of N.J.) ; D. Brion, A Proposed Wetlands Protection
Statute for the Virginia Wetlands, May 26, 1970 (unpublished seminar paper on file
with Professor Garrett Power, University of Maryland School of Law).
4. Ch. 241, § 1, [19701 Md. Laws 241 [hereinafter cited as MD. ANN. CODE art.
66C, §§ 718-31 (Supp. 1970)].
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 54. §§ 45, 46, 47 (1968).
MARYLAND'S WETLANDS
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Title to Lands Under Navigable Waters
Under the early English common law a riparian subject could
own the beds of both fresh and tidal waters to the extent that they
were of value to him.6 During the reign of Elizabeth I, however, a
significant change occurred in the law governing title to submerged
lands. Basing their decisions on the works of several early treatise
writers,' the English courts began to accept the theory that the
Crown owned the beds, including the foreshores,' of tidal waters as land
not granted out by the sovereign. Not long afterward, the substance
of this theory became firmly established in America as well and has
played a significant role in the determination of title to land under
navigable water.9
This notion was interpreted as meaning that the State of Mary-
land, as a successor in interest to the Crown, had title to the lands
under its navigable waters and had the power to alienate it.10 The
power of the State to grant title to lands under navigable waters
posed a serious threat to the riparian landowner, however. His com-
mon law riparian right to accretions (discussed infra) could easily
be rendered valueless if submerged land contiguous to his premises
6. The distinction between tidal and fresh water with respect to ownership of
the beds did not exist under the earliest English law. See Fraser, Title to Soil Under
Public Waters - A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313, 315 (1918). See generally
I FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 36 (1904).
7. Foremost among these writers were Thomas Digges and Lord Hale. Diggesfirst promulgated the theory that the Crown owned prima facie the beds under tidal
waters in his treatise entitled Proofs of the Queen's Interest in Lands Left by the Sea
and the Salt Shores. However, not until Lord Hale redefined the unique doctrine inhis great work De Jure Marls, which has become the main source of the modern law
in this area, was it accorded any significance. See F. MALONEY, S. PLAYER & F.
BALDWIN, JR., WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION - THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 351(1968).
8. "Foreshore" is the "land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 777 (4th ed. 1951).
9. Navigable waters in Maryland are defined as those which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide. Those waters which are not subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide are non-navigable even if they can be used for purposes of commerce or
travel. Wagner v. Mayor & City Council, 210 Md. 615, 624, 124 A.2d 815, 819-20(1956) ; Linthicum v. Shipley, 140 Md. 96, 98, 116 A. 871 (1922). The federal testfor navigability, which is also the test used by the great majority of states, differsfrom the Maryland common law rule. Navigability in fact is the sole criterion. Thus,
if a waterway is capable of being used in its ordinary condition as a highway of com-
merce, it is deemed navigable. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557(1870); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). For a discussion of the
Maryland navigability test, see 5 MD. L. REV. 314, 315 (1941).
10. See Brown v. Kennedy, 5 Harr. & J. 195 (Md. 1821); cf. Mayor & CityCouncil v. Canton Co., 186 Md. 618, 47 A.2d 775 (1946); see generally U.S. DEP'T
OF INTERIOR, CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, ESTUARINE POLLUTION STUDY
SERIES 92 (1970).
It is questionable whether the State legislature has the authority to effect
such alienation. For the discussion of the public trust doctrine, see notes 132-56 infra
and accompanying text. The dictum in Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Harr. & J. 195, 202,
203 (Md. 1821) suggests that, although the State could alienate these inundated
lands, those who received grants or patents from the State took them subject to the
public rights of fishery and navigation. In 1862, the legislature passed a statute which
provided that the State could not alienate land covered by navigable waters if such
alienation would impair the rights of the riparian proprietor. See note 12 infra.
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were to be granted by the State to a third party." An equally ominous
threat to the riparian landowner was that of a subsidence of the water
level, which could cause the landowner to be altogether cut off from
the water if the formerly submerged land had been conveyed by the
State to someone other than himself. The riparian owner gained
protection from these possible consequences when the legislature
enacted in 1862 what is now section 48 of article 54 of the Maryland
Annotated Code, 2 which reads as follows: "No patent hereafter
issued out of the Land Office shall impair or affect the rights of
riparian proprietors, as explained and declared in §§ 45 and 46; and
no patent shall hereafter issue for land covered by navigable waters."
By prohibiting the issuance by the Land Office of a patent for lands
covered by navigable waters, 3 this section protected riparian rights
and, at least to an extent, prevented the State from alienating title to
the beds of navigable waters. 4 It has been determined that the pro-
hibition contained in section 48 applies to all land below the high
water mark, which includes many marshes and swamps.15 However,
the protection which was afforded riparian owners after 1862 was
largely removed in 1943 by the adoption of the present section 15 of
article 78A,10 which gives the Board of Public Works the power to
issue patents for land under navigable water for a consideration ade-
quate in the opinion of the Board. Acting pursuant to this section,
the Board of Public Works could easily jeopardize the riparian
owner's right of access to the water through a conveyance of the sub-
merged contiguous land to a third party. What is perhaps worse
than the Board's ability to affect the riparian's rights is that it could
convey wetlands indiscriminately, without regard to the effects which
such conveyances might ultimately have on the environment. Great
damage to the ecological balance, due to land reclamation projects on
these conveyed wetlands, could cause irreparable harm to the aquatic
plant and animal life in these areas. The 1970 General Assembly
attempted to eliminate these dangers by its enactment of section 15A
11. Cf. Goodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348, 364 (1875). It was noted in Chapman v.Hoskins, 2 Md. Ch. 485 (1851) that the State's power to convey submerged land was
seldom exercised when it would jeopardize riparian rights. Moreover, the court
viewed such a threat as a sufficient equitable ground to refuse to uphold the grant
of a patent.
12. Ch. 129, § 1(39), [1862] Md. Laws 137.
13. In Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586 (1886), the court stated that the only effect of
the last clause of this section is to restrict the powers of the Commissioner of the
Land Office. See also CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at93-94; Dimsey, Wetlands: The Legal Context, in II MARYLAND STATE PLANNING
DEP'T, WETLANDS IN MARYLAND - TECHNICAL REPORT XIV-1 (1970).
14. Since the enactment of this section, patents have been denied, pursuant to
section 48, by the Land Office and by the courts if the desired land was under navigable
water. Wagner v. Mayor & City Council, 210 Md. 615, 124 A.2d 815 (1956);Linthicum v. Shipley, 140 Md. 96, 116 A. 871 (1922).
15. Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530 (1865).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A, § 15 (1969). For an analysis of this section, see
50 OP. ATr'Y'GEN. 452, 472-74 (1965). It has been said that taken together, -section
15 of article 78A and section 48 of article 54 formulate the general rule in Maryland
that the State is owner of all land below the high-water mark of navigable waters
except for such lands for which the State has issued a patent. See Dimsey, Wetlands:
The Legal Context, in II MARYLAND STATE PLANNING DEP'T, WETLANDS IN
MARYLAND - TECHNICAL REPORT XIV-1 (1970).
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of article 78A. 7 The new provision prohibits the Board of Public
Works from conveying title to submerged land owned by the State
to any person other than an abutting riparian owner or proprietor.'8
In determining whether to make a permitted conveyance, the Board
is required to take into account "the best interests of the State with
respect to the varying ecological, economic, developmental, agricul-
tural, recreational and aesthetic values of the area under consid-
eration."' 9
B. Riparian Rights
1. Common Law
Notwithstanding the ownership by the State of the beds of
navigable waters, the riparian landowner was deemed to possess cer-
tain rights by virtue of his proximity to the water. The nature and
extent of these rights has been a topic of legal and political contro-
versy for many years. At common law the principle was well estab-
lished that, where a tract of land was situated adjacent or contiguous
to navigable water, any increase in that land as a result of the gradual
and natural process of sediment deposit along the shore inured to the
riparian landowner.2" Such a build-up of soil is technically termed an
accretion.2 The riparian landowner was similarly entitled to land
formed by reliction, the exposure of land by a gradual subsidence of
the water.22  The justification for granting the riparian landowner
title to such land stemmed from several considerations. Public policy
favored the rule because the new land, though small in quantity, could
be made immediately productive."3 In addition, allowing the riparian
owner title to the newly formed land seemed merely part of a bal-
ancing process since the gain would often be offset by the loss of soil
worn away through tidal erosion. 4  But perhaps the paramount rea-
17. Ch. 242, [1970] Md. Laws 551 [hereinafter cited as MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A,
§ ISA (Supp. 1970)].
18. The prior statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A, § 15 (1969), gave the Board of
Public Works broad authority to issue patents to anyone for land under navigable
water.
19. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A, § 15A (Supp. 1970).
20. Linthicum v. Coan, 64 Md. 439, 450-52 (1886); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Chase, 43 Md. 23, 34-35 (1875); Giraud v. Hughes, 1 Gill & Johns. 115, 125-26
(Md. 1829).
21. The deposit of soil itself is known as alluvion. BLAcCK's LAW DICrIONARY
102 (4th ed. 1951).
22. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23 (1875).
23. See 1 K. AIGLER, A. SMITH & S. TE1Fr, CASES ON PROPERTY 464-65 (1960).
24. In Giraud v. Hughes, 1 Gill & Johns. 249 (Md. 1829), the court, relying on
the following quotation from Blackstone, noted this early principle upon which the
accretion doctrine was founded:
. . as to land gained from the sea, either by alluvion by the washing up of sand
and earth, so as in time, to make terra firma, or by dereliction, as when the sea
shrinks back below the usual water mark; in these cases the law is held to be,
that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it shall
go to the owner of the land adjoining.
Id. at 264 (emphasis added). The court then went on to say:
It is then not upon the principle that the land calls for the water, but because it
adjoins the water, that the owner acquires a title to the soil so formed, for, con-
tinues he, de minintis non curat lex; and besides these owners being often losers
by the breaking in of the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is
therefore, a reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss; here we have
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
son for adoption of this principle was that it would preserve the
riparian owner's right to the use of the water.25 If another party were
permitted to gain title to accretions or to land exposed by the sub-
sidence of the water, the riparian landowner would be deprived of
his valuable water-access rights. The doctrines of accretion and re-
liction eliminate this possibility.
2. Maryland Statutory Provisions
The first statutory provision in Maryland extending these com-
mon law riparian rights was contained in the Act of 1745, which had
as it primary legislative purpose the establishment of several new
towns. Among these was one on the north side of the Patapsco River
to be known as Baltimore-town. Section 10 of the chapter creating
Baltimore-town reads as follows: "All improvements, of what kind
foever [sic], either wharfs, houses, or other buildings, that have or
shall be made out of the water, or where it usually flows, shall (as an
encouragement to such improvers,) be for ever deemed the right,
title and inheritance of such improvers, their heirs and assigns for
ever."
26
The apparent intent of this provision was "to encourage im-
provements on the water-fronts of the harbor of Baltimore, for the
convenience and accommodation of commerce ... - In furtherance
of this purpose, the State agreed to relinquish all its right as sov-
ereign to the shores covered by such improvements to those who con-
structed them.28  The ultimate result was the development of Balti-
more into a bustling port city and the transformation of the Baltimore
harbor shoreline from a concave figure to a rectangular one. 9
The right conferred by the Act to make riparian improvements
and acquire title to the land thereto was considered valuable and
extraordinary. It was construed to be "a franchise, - a vested right
peculiar in its nature, but a quasi property, of which the lot owner
cannot be lawfully deprived without his consent."3 The only restric-
tion on the riparian's right to build improvements out from the land was
that these improvements be confined to the front of his own lot."' Once
in plain and strong language, the reason of the rule, which places the acquisition of
the additional soil by the owner of the adjoining land, upon the ground, that he
might be a loser by the breaking in of the sea, or at an expense to keep it out.Id.
25. See, e.g., Steinem v. Romney, 233 Md. 16, 194 A.2d 774 (1963).
26. Ch. 9, § 10, [1745] Md. Laws. In 1835, this enactment was supplanted by
a law giving riparian landowners throughout the State permission to construct
wharves. Ch. 168, [1835] Md. Laws. But the adoption of the 1860 code in effect
repealed the 1745 provision. See Mayor & City Council v. Canton Co., 186 Md. 618,
623 (1945).
27. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, 36 (1875). See note 64 infra.
28. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23 (1875) ; 50 OP. Arr'Y GEN. 452,
464-65 (1965). See also notes 30-32 in fra and accompanying text.
29. Mayor & City Council v. Canton Co., 186 Md. 618, 624, 47 A.2d 775, 778
(1946).
30. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, 36 (1875). See Casey's Lessee v.
Inoles, 1 Gill 430, 501 (Md. 1844).
31. See, e.g., Dugan v. Baltimore, 5 Gill & Johns. 357, 367-68 (Md. 1833). For
a discussion of the Maryland cases dealing with the problem of what constitutes the
front of the riparian owner's lot, see CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL PERspnc'rwv supra
note 10, at 102-06.
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such improvements were made, the title to the land under which they
rested would vest in the riparian landowner." Such title was to be
"original" rather than "derivative" and was, in a sense, similar to
the title acquired by adverse possession."'
The Act of 1745 was repealed by the codification of the Mary-
land laws in 1860."' The only provision for riparian rights con-
tained in the new codification was a modified version of an 1835
statute 5 which had provided for the construction of wharves on the
navigable waters of the State. This limited provision was expanded
when the General Assembly enacted chapter 129 of the Acts of 1862,
now codified as sections 45 and 46 of article 54 of the Maryland
Annotated Code, which read as follows:
§ 45. Accretion to land on navigable river.
The proprietor of land bounding on any of the navigable
waters of this State shall be entitled to all accretions to said
land by the recession of said water, whether heretofore or here-
after formed or made by natural causes or otherwise, in like
manner and to like extent as such right may or can be claimed
by the proprietor of land bounding on water not navigable.
§ 46. Right to make improvements in front of land on navigable
river.
The proprietor of land bounding on any of the navigable
waters of this State shall be entitled to the exclusive right of
making improvements into the waters in front of his said land;
such improvements and other accretions as above provided for
shall pass to the successive owners of the land to which they are
attached, as incident to their respective estates. But no such
improvement shall be so made as to interfere with the naviga-
tion of the stream of water into which the said improvement is
made.""
The major difficulties experienced with these provisions during
the past century have been in defining and circumscribing the riparian
rights which they accord. Because of the ever-increasing prices
brought by waterfront property, especially in the coastal areas of the
32. In Giraud v. Hughes, 1 Gill & Johns. 249, 265 (Md. 1829), the court decided
that the right to make improvements in navigable waters granted by the Act of 1745,
chapter 9, section 10, was a mere privilege of acquiring property by reclaiming it from
the water and that, until the improvement was completed, no title was acquired by the
adjacent owner. On the basis of this doctrine, the court in Casey's Lessee v. Inoles,
1 Gill 430 (Md. 1844) held that, where a riparian proprietor had not made any
improvement in front of his property, his right to make them was intercepted by a
grant from the State of land covered by navigable water contiguous to his property.
33. Cf. 1 R. AIGLER, A. SMITH & S. TEFFT, CASES ON PROPERTY 464 (1960).
34. See note 26 supra. The provisions of the Act of 1745 were simply omitted
from the recodification.
35. Compare ch. 168, [1835] Md. Laws with Md. Code Public General Laws art.
XCVII, § 21 (1860).
36. These sections are hereinafter referred to as sections 45 and 46, respectively.
19701
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State, and because of the development of more efficient means of
filling land, many riparian owners have been engaging in reclamation
projects in wetland areas. This activity has raised a controversy
over whether a riparian proprietor can, as a matter of right, 7 fill and
reclaim wetland areas adjacent to his property."8 The uncertainty of
the law in this area 9 has left the validity of many land titles in a
veritable quandry. The following discussion will attempt to resolve
this question.
37. Even if it is assumed that the riparian landowner had, as a matter of right,
the authority to fill and reclaim land under sections 45 and 46, he nevertheless had to
comply with certain regulations. The Harbors and Rivers Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403(1964) declares that "the creation of any obstruction . . . to the navigable capacity
of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited." This act covers both thebuilding of structures and the excavating and filling of land. Since the right of theUnited States to control navigation is superior to the right of the riparian to fill
or construct an improvement, a permit is required. Unless the Secretary of the Army,
upon the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, issues this permit, no obstruction
may be created. Until recently, the decision to grant or deny the permit was based
entirely on the resulting effect on navigability. Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D.Fla. 1969). However, the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. Mar. 1970) substantially changed the test. This act
requires that every federal agency engaged in activities which may have an impact on
man's environment shall take those ecological factors into consideration before pro-
ceeding with their activities. Recently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision in
Zabel v. Tabb, holding that the Secretary of the Army was required by the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act to consider ecological factors before issuing a permit.Zabel v. Tabb, No. 27555 (5th Cir., July 16, 1970). For a discussion of the factors
which the Army Corps of Engineers must now consider, see CONSERVATION AND
NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How THE CORPS
OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H. REP. No.
91-917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 12(a) (Supp. 1969) prohibits, with some excep-
tions, the construction of an obstruction on any existing waterway of the State without
a permit from the Maryland Department of Natural Resources. In Larmar Corp. v.Cropper, Chancery No. 8935 (Cir. Ct. Worcester County, Md., Aug. 31, 1970), the
court held that so much of section 12(a) of article 96A, as amended by chapter 416,[19671 Md. Laws 991, as fails to provide an exception to the permit requirements for
changes in the shorelines of tidal waters within the State is unconstitutional because
of inconsistencies between the title of the section and the substantive language within it.MD. ANN. CODE art. 62B, § 5(q) (1968) gives the Maryland Port Authoritythe power to establish bulkhead lines. A similar power is given to the Worcester
County Shoreline Commission by virtue of sections 15A and 15B of the Public Local
Laws of Worcester County.
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 485 (1967) permitted riparian landowners on
navigable rivers, creeks or branches to dig, dredge, take and carry away sand andgravel from the beds of such waters below the high-water mark. This section was
repealed by the new Maryland Wetlands Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 731(Supp. 1970).
39. Two opinions of the Attorney General come to opposite conclusions regarding
the right of the riparian landowner to fill and reclaim land. The earlier opinion,
relying heavily on the common law doctrine of accretions and ignoring much of the
statutory language, stated that sections 45 and 46 were limited to natural accretions
and structural improvements and did not encompass dredging and filling. 50 Op. ATT'y
GEN. 452 (1965). In the later opinion the Attorney General ruled that not only could
a riparian fill and reclaim land from the sea, but that he acquired good title to theproperty so reclaimed and could grant and convey the same. 52 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 324(1967). This opinion was distinguished from the earlier one on the ground that the
earlier opinion dealt with the propriety of filling riparian land for a purpose which
was not incidental to or connected with the riparian use of the property. This dis-
tinction seems rather tenuous.
Confusion as to the existence of reclamation rights of riparian landowners inMaryland exists in federal as well as state courts. See United States v. 222.0 Acres of
Land, 306 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1969).
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(a) Accretions - section 45
The language and legislative intent of section 45 is as confusing
as the conflicting interpretations that have been given it. The sec-
tion entitles riparian landowners "to all accretions to said land by
the recession of said waters,"4 a phrase which is technically inaccurate
since it confuses accretion, which is a gradual and imperceptible build-
up of soil deposits on the shore, with reliction, which is an exposure
of submerged land by the retrocession of the water.4 Further am-
biguities arise from the wording "accretions . . . made by natural
causes or otherwise." Since at common law accretions could only
be formed by natural causes,4 2 it is unclear what accretions "made
. . . otherwise" are. Particularly troublesome is the question of
whether land reclaimed by filling comes within the purview of accre-
tions "made . . .otherwise."
A possible interpretation is that accretions "made . . . other-
wise" refers to land created by accretion or reliction due to some
artificial condition effected by the riparian owner4 3 or by some third
party." Such accretions could form as a result of the erection of
dikes,4  wharves,46 groins for the purpose of protecting the shore
from erosion, 4 ' or any number of artificial structures which would
hasten the natural build-up of soil deposits. These accretions, while
not natural, are unintentionally accelerated and, therefore, are dis-
tinguishable from the reclamation of land by intentional filling carried
out for the express purpose of creating new fast land. When this
narrow interpretation of the statutory language is considered together
with the rationale for the common law principles governing the title
to accretions, 48 it provides little support for permitting the riparian
landowner to expand his holdings by filling.
The wording of section 45 is quite broad, however, and at least
one commentator has stated that it may be broad enough to allow
the riparian owner to reclaim land by artificial means.4 9 Moreover,
in Melvin v. Schlessinger.5 ° the Maryland Court of Appeals had oc-
40. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
41. See 50 Op. ATT'Y G.N. 452, 460 (1965).
42. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
43. Cf. Brundage v. Knox, 279 111. 450, 117 N.E. 123 (1917) (accretion caused
by artificial means erected by the riparian owner).
44. Cf. St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).; The
Edmondson Island Case, 42 F. 15 (C.C. Md. 1890). These cases allow the riparian
to acquire title to land formed as a result of action taken by a third person when
the riparian took no part in the filling.
45. Gillihan v. Cieloha, 74 Ore. 462, 145 P. 1061 (1915).
46. Tatum v. City of St. Louis, 125 Mo. 647, 28 S.W. 1002 (1894).
47. Brighton & Hove General Gas Co. v. Hove Bungalows, Ltd., 1 Ch. 372(Eng. 1924).
48. The great weight of authority has held that the common law accretion
doctrine does not apply to reclaimed land. See Burns v. Forbes, 412 F.2d 995 (3d Cir.
1969) ; Revell v. People, 177 Ill. 468, 52 N.E. 1052 (1898) ; Michaelson v. Silver
Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1961) ; Saunders v.
New York Cent. & H.R.R., 144 N.Y. 75, 38 N.E. 992, 993-94 (1894). See also 50
Op. Ar'' GEN. 452, 460-64 (1965).
49. See CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at 98-101.
Professor Power (the author of this study), in coming to this conclusion, rebuts the
thesis of the Attorney General in 50 Op. ATT'y GEN. 452 (1965).
50. 138 Md. 337, 113 A. 875 (1921).
1970]
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casion to construe section 45 in a dispute over the validity of title to
an accretion which had formed near the edge of the channel of the
Patapsco River and extended toward the shore. Melvin, with a group
of others, acquired a patent to the tract in question and sought to
enforce a contract of sale to Schlessinger, who declined to buy the
property alleging that the patentees were never in possession of it
and, therefore, could not convey marketable title. Holding that the
property was an accretion and as such could not be patented away
since to do so would impair the rights of the riparian landowner,"
the court went on to give a very thorough analysis of chapter 129 of
the Acts of 1862. Speaking of what is now section 45, the court
stated that this provision should be interpreted broadly since its pur-
pose was to enlarge riparian rights:
As already stated, the riparian owners had the right to such
accretions before the passage of the Act when they were im-
perceptibly formed, and now to say that their rights, enlarged
by the statute, go only to the extent of adding thereto accretions
which have more rapidly and suddenly formed, from natural
causes or otherwise, extending outward from the shore, would
be giving the statute a very narrow construction and one that,
we think, should not be adopted.5 2
This passage clearly suggests that the court felt that section 45 was
extensive in scope and included not only accretions beginning in the
water and extending inward towards shore but also accretions formed
by other than natural action. Taken one step further, these accretions
formed by other than natural action could include land formed by
filling.
The last phrase of section 45 bolsters the conclusion that these
accretion provisions should be interpreted broadly. It states that the
riparian owner is entitled to accretions "in like manner and to like
extent as such right may or can be claimed by the proprietor of land
bounding on water not navigable."53 Since the owner of land bound-
ing on "water not navigable" owned title to the bed of the water ad
medium filum aquae,54 there is little doubt that he could fill and re-
claim the submerged portion of his property providing the riparian
rights of others are not adversely affected.5" It has been said, how-
ever, that the Act of 1862 was not intended to give the riparian
landowner title to the bed of the adjacent navigable stream ad medium
filuin aquae since accretions alone were intended to be affected and
not the bed of the stream prior to the formation of such accretions.56
It would seem from even this construction that once accretions were
51. Id. at 344.
52. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
53. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Harr.
& J. 195, 205-06 (Md. 1821), where Judge Buchanan notes the similarity between the
rights of riparian landowners and the owners of land contiguous to water which is
non-navigable.
54. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Shipley, 140 Md. 96, 116 A. 871 (1922).
55. Cf. Mayor & City Council v. Appold, 42 Md. 442 (1875) ; Goodsell v. Lawson,
42 Md. 348 (1875) ; Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Harr. & J. 195 (Md. 1821).
56. Melvin v. Schlessinger, 138 Md. 337, 341, 113 A. 875 (1921).
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formed, whether from artificial or natural causes, the riparian owner
would gain title to them in the same manner as would his counter-
part on non-navigable water.1
7
Finally, the view that the scope of section 45 includes man-made
increases as well as natural ones is supported by the language of sec-
tion 46. This provision places "other accretions" in the same category
with "improvements" and provides that both of these additions to
the land belong to the abutting riparian landowner.5
(b) Improvements - section 46
It has been contended that the Act of 1862, and especially section
46, which confers the right to make improvements, is merely a re-
enactment of the Act of 1745 on a State-wide scale. 9 The basis for
this conclusion lies in the fact that the General Assembly, two years
after the repeal of the 1745 Act, used the identical word "improve-
ments" in enacting section 46.' 0 Since at common law the riparian
owner had no right to make improvements extending into the water,61
it is reasoned that the 1862 Act carries over the intent of the 1745 Act
which provided for such improvements. If this construction is ac-
cepted, it appears that the riparian landowner could, as a matter of
right, fill and reclaim submerged land contiguous to his property
since there is little doubt that the Act of 1745 conferred broad and
extensive rights, including the right to fill.6 2
There is support, however, for the position that this section
should be construed much more narrowly.63 Basing its argument
upon the historical background of the Act of 1745, a 1965 Attorney
General's Opinion reasoned that that Act included liberal riparian
rights provisions as an incentive to develop the Baltimore harbor.6
Since the Act of 1862 applies to all the waters of the State and not
merely to the Baltimore harbor area, the Attorney General had diffi-
culty in finding a similar intent in the enactment of the 1862 statute.
Consequently, the Opinion concluded that the 1862 provisions should
receive a more strict interpretation.
The cases construing section 46 also contain a certain am-
bivalence, especially as to the meaning of the term "improvements."
One interpretation has given the improvement section a conventional
and restricted construction.65 In Hess v. Muir,66 for example, im-
57. See Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 597, 5 A. 540, 6 A. 673 (1886).
58. See CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL PERsPEcTrVE, supra note 10, at 100.
59. See Mayor & City Council v. Canton Co., 186 Md. 618, 625, 47 A.2d 775,
778 (1946); 50 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 452, 465 (1965).
60. See CHESAPEAxE BAY IN LEGAL PERSPECTrVE, supra note 10, at 100-01.
61. Melvin v. Schlessinger, 138 Md. 337, 340, 113 A. 875, 876 (1921).
62. See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, 33-34 (1875).
63. See 50 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 452, 464-69 (1965).
64. Id. at 465. The intent of the Act of 1745 was described as follows: "It was
designed to convert the lower reaches of the Patapsco River into an international
seaport with adequate berthing and warehousing facilities for vessels of the deepest
draft. The right to fill and reclaim land thereunder without connection to harbor
development was, we must conclude, unthinkable." Id.
65. See Culley v. Hollis, 180 Md. 372, 25 A.2d 196 (1942); Hodson v. Nelson,
122 Md. 330, 89 A. 934 (1914) ; Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 5 A. 540, 6 A. 673 (1886).
66. 65 Md. 586, 5 A. 540, 6 A. 673 (1886).
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provements were defined as "such structures as are subservient to
the land, and which used in connection with the land, enhance its
value or enlarge its commercial or agricultural facilities, or other
utility, to an extent the land alone would be incapable of, and in this
way 'improve' it . . . . Wharves, piers and landings are examples of
such improvements.""7 This suggests that only structural improve-
ments were contemplated by section 46 since other types of improve-
ments, such as the reclamation of land, do not "improve" the existing
land, but merely create new land.68
The principal adjudication of the right to reclaim land as an exer-
cise of the statutory right to improve was in Goodsell v. Lawson.6" Good-
sell, an entreprenuer engaged in oyster packing, leased a parcel of
riparian land from Lawson. Under an agreement in the lease, Goodsell
was to dump oyster shells into the water in front of the property in
order to fill in the submerged land so that it could be reclaimed. Once
the land was filled, however, Goodsell, in derogation of the agreement,
sued out a warrant of survey in which he claimed title, in himself, to
the newly formed land. The court held that the reclaimed land belonged
to Lawson since Goodsell, in filling, merely had acted with the consent
of Lawson. In arriving at this decision, the court interpreted what is
now section 46, stating: "In the exercise of this right of improvement,
the riparian proprietor is not restricted except by the provision, 'that
the improvement so made shall not interfere with the navigation of the
stream of water, into which the said improvement is made.' "70 Thus
implicit in the decision is an acknowledgment of the unfettered right
of the riparian to fill so long as his reclamation does not interfere with
navigation.7 Had Lawson himself done the filling, there would have
been no doubt of his right to have title to the reclaimed land.72
Dicta in other cases interpreting the 1862 statute also recognizes
the right of riparian landowners to fill and acquire title to the lands
thus created. 73 It would therefore appear that, when a riparian land-
owner fills in a submerged area bounding his property and reclaims
the land from the sea, he gains title to that property by operation of
section 46.74
67. Id. at 598.
68. See 50 Op. ATr'y GEN. 452, 464-68 (1965). The Attorney General seems to
include within the scope of section 46 "improvements" small filling projects connected
with wharfing out for the purpose of improving the riparian's own commercial access
to deep water.
69. 42 Md. 348 (1875).
70. Id. at 371-72.
71. See note 37 supra for the regulations protecting navigation with which a
riparian proprietor must comply.
72. See 42 Md. at 360 (1875), where the Maryland Court of Appeals restated
the opinion of the lower court.
73. In a separate opinion in Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 5 A. 540, 6 A. 673 (1886),
Judge Alvey said, "The right given to improve out from the shore into the water,
was designed, manifestly, to embrace only structural improvements, such as wharfs,
piers, warehouses, or the filling out from the shore and reclaiming the land from the
inundation of the water." 65 Md. at 603, 6 A. at 674-75. See also Mayor & City
Council v. Canton Co., 186 Md. 618, 624-27, 47 A.2d 775, 778-79 (1945).
74. Recently, in Larmar Corp. v. Cropper, Chancery No. 8935 (Cir. Ct. Worcester
County, Md., Aug. 31, 1970), it was held that title to land reclaimed under sections 45
and 46 vested in the riparian landowner to the same extent as title to the original
upland may be vested in him. Furthermore, the court said that this title was not now
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II. THE NEW MARYLAND WETLANDS STATUTE
Unlike the previous statutory provisions and the cases interpret-
ing them, the new Maryland Wetlands Statute75 specifically acknowl-
edges the economic, ecological, recreational and -aesthetic value of the
wetlands and recognizes the possibility and the danger of totally de-
stroying these areas if the despoilation were to continue at the present
rate. 6  The wetlands are no longer dealt with. as useless swamp-
lands, but rather are recognized as invaluable breeding and feeding
grounds for aquatic plant and animal life, as sources of recreational
enjoyment, as barriers useful for the reduction of flood damage and
as sediment-absorbing parcels for the prevention of channel siltation
which would impair navigation. 7  This shift in policy is apparent
from the removal of the provisions controlling wetland areas from
the Hall of Records article of the Maryland Annotated Code7" and
their placement in the Natural Resources article 9 under the new
subtitle "Wetlands." The primary function *of these new provisions
is to provide a State policy for the preservation of wetlands and to
establish rules and regulations for filling and dredging. 0 The ad-
ministration of the Act is, in general, entrusted :to the Secretary of
Natural Resources.
One major contribution of the statute is to provide for both
a legal and a geographical definition of the term "wetlands." Dividing
the wetland areas into State wetlands and private wetlands,8 ' the
new statute also attempts to clarify the nature and extent of the
riparian rights with respect to each area. 'State wetlands" and "private
wetlands" are defined in section 719:
(a) "State wetlands" means all land under the navigable
waters of the State below the mean high tide, which is affected by
the regular rise and fall of the tide. Such wetlands, which have
been transferred by the State by a valid grant, lease or patent or a
subject to any right or claim of the State, or of any other person or corporation,
except to the extent that the original upland may have been subject to such right
or claim.
75. Sections 718-31 were added, under the subtitle "Wetlands," to article 66C
of the Maryland Annotated Code. Ch. 241, § 1, [1970] Md. Laws 544. A bill similar
to the one enacted was introduced in the 1969 General Assembly, but failed to pass
the House of Delegates. See H.B. No. 469, 1969 Md. General Assembly. For a
compilation of wetland legislation in other states, see Dimsey, Wetlands: The Legal
Context, in II MARYLAND STATE PLANNING DEP'T, WETLANDS IN MARYLAND -
TECHNICAL REPORT XIV-2-11 (1970). See also D. Brion, A Proposed Wetlands
Protection Statute for the Virginia Wetlands, May 26, 1970 (unpublished seminarpaper on file with Professor Garrett Power of the University of Maryland School
of Law).
76. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 718 (Supp. 1970) states the policy and intent of
the Wetlands Act.
77. The value of these wetland areas to the State is indicated in II MARYLAND
STATE PLANNING DEP'T, WETLANDS IN MARYLAND - TECHNICAL REPORT III-1(1970), where it was concluded that wetlands "are an exceedingly valuable resource
asset to the State of Maryland."
78. MD. ANN. CODE art. 54, §§ 45, 46, 47 (1968).
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-31 (Supp. 1970).
80. See note 98 infra and accompanying text.
81. State wetlands are governed by sections 720 and 721 of article 66C while
private wetlands are controlled by sections 723 through 730. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C,§§ 720-21, 723-30 (Supp. 1970).
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grant confirmed by Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of Maryland, shall be considered "private wetland"
to the extent of the interest so transferred.
(b) "Private wetlands" means all lands not considered "State
wetlands" bordering on or lying beneath tidal waters, which
are subject to regular or periodic tidal action and which sup-
port aquatic growth. These include wetlands, which have been
transferred by the State by a valid grant, lease or patent or a
grant confirmed by Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights of
the Constitution of Maryland, to the extent of the interest so
transferred.12
Subsection (f) defines "regular or periodic tidal action" as "the rise
and fall of the sea that is produced by the attraction of the sun
and the moon uninfluenced by winds or other circumstances.""
To understand the scope of this new Act, it is important to note that
"wetlands" includes fully submerged land - it is not limited to marshes
and the like. Under these definitions "State" and "private" wetlands
differ in several respects. State wetlands must be under the navigable
waters of the State, below mean high tide, and affected by the regular
rise and fall of the tide. Private wetlands do not have to be under the
navigable water of the State, nor do they have to be below mean high
tide; they need only border tidal waters, be subject to some tidal
action, and support aquatic growth. Thus within the sphere of "pri-
vate wetlands" are many marsh areas which are affected by tidal
waters only during certain seasons of the year. As a practical matter
it will be difficult to distinguish regular tidal action from periodic
tidal action, except in extreme cases. This problem is best solved
by the taking of a survey after the Secretary has sufficiently refined
the statutory definition. A key provision of the new statute calls for
the taking of such an inventory of private wetlands.8 4 The Secretary
of Natural Resources is instructed to make private wetland boundary
maps establishing the boundaries of wetland areas for each sub-
division of the State and to enforce the rules and regulations govern-
ing activities in the private wetland areas so established. Since the
designation of a parcel of land as a private wetland area allows the
Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations which will necessarily
restrict its uses, the Act provides for hearings at which a property-
owner may challenge the classification of his land. 5 If, after such
hearing, any person having a recorded interest in the lands affected
is dissatisfied with the Secretary's classification of his property, or
with the rules and regulations affecting it, he is permitted an appeal
to the Board of Review of the Department of Natural Resources. If
the landowner wishes to appeal the Board's recommendation on the
82. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 719(a)-(b) (Supp. 1970).
83. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 719(f) (Supp. 1970).
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 724 (Supp. 1970). For an example of rules and
regulations regarding the taking of inventories, see MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, PROPOSED ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIVATE WETLAND BOUNDARIES
IN CALVERT COUNTY, MARYLAND, AND PROPOSED RULES AND REGULATIONS (1970).
85. Id.
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ground that it effects an unconstitutional taking, he may do so in
the circuit court of the county in which the land is located. In arriving
at its decision, the circuit court is instructed by the statute to weigh
the limitations on the reasonable exercise of the police power against
the statutorily acknowledged ecological, public health and welfare
considerations. The decision of the circuit court may be appealed by
either party to the Maryland Court of Appeals. 6
In addition to providing for the promulgation of rules and regu-
lations governing activities on private wetlands, the new Act con-
tains a procedure for obtaining permission to conduct, on private
wetlands, activities not permitted by those rules and regulations."7
The person desiring to conduct such activity must obtain a permit
from the Secretary of Natural Resources. Again, the statute calls
for full public hearings regarding the proposed activity and allows
either the applicant, the county, or municipality in which the land is
located to appeal the Secretary's decision to the Board of Review. 8
These sections reinforce the ecological and public health and welfare
interests that are the hallmark of the entire Act." In issuing a per-
mit, the Secretary may require a bond to secure compliance with any
conditions or limitations enumerated in the permit."0 The Secretary
is authorized to suspend or revoke a permit if an applicant violates
the conditions of the permit or exceeds the scope of the work as set
forth in the application.91
The repeal of sections 45, 46 and 47 of article 54 and section
485 of article 2792 and the incorporation of their principal parts (minus
certain ambiguities) into one new statute has further clarified the
law by removing many doubts over the validity of title to land
reclaimed from navigable waters. Riparian landowners who have
filled and attempted to reclaim land prior to the effective date of the
new Act will still have to contend with the uncertainties of the old
provisions;93 but landowners who fill and reclaim wetlands after
July 1, 1970, the effective date of the new statute, will have the bene-
fit of a more clearly delineated policy with respect to their riparian
rights.
86. The procedure for appealing the designation of property as a wetland is out-
lined in MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 725 (Supp. 1970).
87. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 726 (Supp. 1970).
88. The appeal provision is contained in MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 728 (Supp.
1970).
89. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 727 (Supp. 1970) delineates the following policy:
In granting, denying or limiting any permit, the Secretary or his duly desig-
nated hearing officer shall consider the effect of the proposed work with reference
to the public health and welfare, marine fisheries, shell-fisheries, wildlife, economic
benefits, the protection of life and property from flood, hurricane and other natural
disasters, and the public policy set forth in this subtitle. In granting a permit the
Secretary may limit or impose conditions or limitations designed to carry out
the public policy set forth in this subtitle.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Ch. 241, § 2, [1970] Md. Laws 550 repeals these provisions. Sections 45 and
46 are found in the text accompanying note 36 supra. Section 47 provided that a
riparian owner could make improvements despite resulting injury to oyster bed
or bottom. For the discussion of section 485 of article 27, see note 38 supra.
93. See Larmar Corp. v. Cropper, Chancery No. 8935 (Cir. Ct. Worcester County,
Md., Aug. 31, 1970).
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The new law conforms more to the common law than to the
previous statutory law in that it entitles the riparian owner to natural
accretions only. 94 The accretions "made . . . otherwise" wording of
the Act of 1862 as well as the language placing the riparian owner
on an equal footing with the owner of land adjoining non-navigable
water have been eliminated. The improvement section of the 1862
Act has also been narrowed significantly; the new statute only pro-
vides specifically for improvements for the purpose of preserving the
riparian's access to the water or for protecting his shore against
erosion." This limitation vitiates any statutory right of the riparian
owner to reclaim wetlands by filling under the guise of statutory
improvements. But the new law does provide for the development
of State wetlands for other uses if such uses receive the approval
of the Board of Public Works. 6
State wetlands are generally more strictly controlled than private
wetlands 7 under the new enactment, especially with respect to dredg-
ing and filling."8 The statute implies that it is lawful to fill, dredge
or otherwise alter private wetlands, subject to the rules and regula-
tions promulgated by the Secretary of Natural Resources. The prime
consideration in the promulgation of these rules is the ecological and
and public welfare ramifications of the dredging activities. The pro-
visions dealing with State wetlands are considerably more rigid.
94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 720 (Supp. 1970) contains the new accretion and
improvement provisions:
The owner of land bounding on navigable waters shall be entitled to all
natural accretions to said land and to make improvements into the waters in front
of said land for the purposes of preserving his access to navigable water or for
protecting his shore against erosion. After an improvement has been constructed,
it shall become the property of the owner of the land to which it is attached.
None of the rights covered under this subheading shall exclude the owner from
developing other uses as approved by the Board of Public Works.
95. Id. Of course, a riparian owner could still contend that a filling project is an
improvement made to provide him with access to the water. Acceptance of this inter-
pretation of the term "improvement" seems unlikely. But it may have been better if
the drafters of the statute had limited "improvements" to structural improvements or
at least defined the scope of the improvements contemplated.
96. Id.
97. The lawful uses of private wetlands are delineated by the new enactment in
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 723 (Supp. 1970).
98. The dredging and filling of both private and State wetlands are governed by
several sections of the new statute. Dredging and filling are defined in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66C, §§ 719(c)-(d) (Supp. 1970):
(c) "Dredging" means the removal or displacement by any means of soil,
sand, gravel, shells or other material, whether of intrinsic value or not, from
State or private wetlands affected by the regular ebb and flow of the tide.
(d) "Filling" means either the displacement of navigable waters by the deposi-
tion into wetlands affected by the regular ebb and flow of the tide of soil, sand,
gravel, shells or other material; or the artificial alteration of navigable water
levels by physical structures, drainage ditches or otherwise.
M . ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 721 (Supp. 1970) declares the policy regarding
the filling of State wetlands. This section makes it "unlawful for any person to dredge
or fill on State wetlands, except to the extent that he has been issued a license to do
so by the Board of Public Works." Parts of this section were construed in a recent
Opinion of the Attorney General dated August 26, 1970. Daily Record, Aug. 31, 1970,
at 4, col. 2.
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 722 (Supp. 1970) declares the policy regarding
the filling of private wetlands. This section authorizes the Secretary of Natural
Resources to "promulgate rules and regulations governing dredging, filling, removing
or otherwise altering or polluting private wetlands."
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With certain exceptions, it is now unlawful to fill or dredge on State
wetlands without a license from the Board of Public Works.9 The
procedure for obtaining this license involves consultation with inter-
ested federal, State and local authorities, the submission by the Sec-
retary of a report with recommendations to the Board, and the hold-
ing of hearings in the local subdivision affected. The terms and con-
ditions of such licenses may vary as to specific tracts of wetlands de-
pending upon various recreational, aesthetic and ecological consid-
erations.
The penalties provided for non-compliance with the statute are
significant. In addition to allowing the imposition of a fine or im-
prisonment, section 730 of article 66C permits a court to hold any-
one who "knowingly violates" the Act, or the rules and regulations
promulgated under it, liable to the State for the cost of restoring the
wetland to its condition prior to the violation.
The statute expressly provides that in no way will it affect the
provisions of sections 15A and 15B of the Code of Public Local Laws
of Worcester County which establish a Shoreline Commission to
designate a "fill and bulkhead line" and a "borrow area limit line"
along the easterly side of the Isle of Wight Bay and the Assawoman
Bay in Worcester County.1"' The apparent intent of sections 15A
and 15B was to give control of filling and dredging activities on both
State and private wetlands in Worcester County to local authorities.
Since the new Wetlands Act allows these provisions to remain in
force, apparently those desiring to fill wetlands in Worcester County
must now obtain permits from both the Department of Natural Re-
sources and the Worcester County Shoreline Commission. This dual
permit system appears desirable since it would allow local supervision
of land reclamation projects as well as control by a panel of expert
State authorities who would evaluate the environmental repercus-
sions of any dredging and filling. However, the preservation of sec-
tions 15A and 15B by the statute could be interpreted to mean that
the Worcester County Shoreline Commission has exclusive authority
to control filling and dredging within the county, an interpretation
which would render the provisions of the new statute which control
filling and dredging inapplicable to Worcester County. Such a construc-
tion was adopted by the Worcester County Circuit Court in a recent
decision, Larinar Corp. v. Cropper.' In that case the complainant
sought a declaratory judgment defining his right to fill, as well as
an adjudication of the title to land which he had already filled. The
constitutionality of the statute creating the Worcester County Shore-
line Commission was attacked on the ground that it infringed upon
the riparian owner's right to fill and reclaim land under sections 45,
46 and 48 of article 54 by making a permit mandatory for all land-
fill projects. The complainant contended that rights established by
these sections can be subject only to the right of navigation, and not
to any further restriction. The court rejected this argument, holding
99. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 721 (Supp. 1970), note 98 supra.
100. Ch.. 241, § 3, [19701 Md. Laws 550.
101. Chancery No. 8935 (Cir. Ct. Worcester County, Md., Aug. 31, 1970).
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that the grant of authority of the Commission did not conflict with
any of these riparian rights; the court felt that sections 45, 46 and
48 granted, not a vested right to fill, but merely a franchise subject
to modification or revocation by the legislature. The legislative intent
to restrict these rights was implicit in the General Assembly's enact-
ment of what are codified as sections 15A and 15B of the Public
Local Laws of Worcester County so that, if a riparian owner desires
to fill, he can do so only upon obtaining a permit from the Worcester
County Shoreline Commission. No mention was made of a necessity
of obtaining a permit from the Department of Natural Resources.
In fact, Judge Prettyman, after reciting the provision of the wetlands
statute exempting from its effect sections 15A and 15B, said, "The
issue, therefore, narrows to the inquiry as to any riparian rights
granted unto Larmar Corporation by virtue of those sections of the
Public Local Laws of Worcester County.""'
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE WETLANDS ACT
There are a great many legal considerations surrounding any
statute which controls the use of privately held lands. In the case of
the new Wetlands Act, several questions are immediately apparent.
First, do the restrictions which it places upon the use and develop-
ment of private wetlands amount to an uncompensated taking within
the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment? Second. does the Act's re-
peal of the statutory sections formerly governing riparian rights simi-
larly constitute an uncompensated taking? Finally, is the new statute, as
well as the former provisions, violative of the "public trust doctrine"
which governs the use of public wetlands in many jurisdictions?
A. Uncompensated Taking
Under the United States Constitution,0 3 as well as the Mary-
land Constitution,"' the State is prohibited from taking private prop-
erty for public use without just compensation. 0 5 A taking in the
constitutional sense does not necessarily import a physical confisca-
tion of property; a state may effect a taking through the exercise of
its regulatory authority.'0 6 The state's police power permits it to
place reasonable restrictions upon the use of an individual's property
where public interests so dictate;107 such restrictions may include,
for example, comprehensive zoning plans, and rules and regulations
governing the conduct of certain activities on the property. 08 Under
102. Id. at 15.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. MD. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 40, 40A, 40B.
105. For two excellent discussions of the subject of "takings" and just compen-
sation, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of Just Compensation, 80 HARV. L. Rxv. 1165 (1967) ; Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
106. See, e.g., City of Baltimore v. Cohen, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954).
107. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; City
of Baltimore v. Cohen, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954).
108. E.g., City of Baltimore v. Cohen, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954);
American Oil Co. v. Miller, 204 Md. 32, 102 A2d 727 (1954); Colati v. Jirout, 186
Md. 652, 47 A.2d 613 (1946).
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certain circumstances the individual's right to use privately owned
property is subordinate to the right of the state to protect its citi-
zens." 9  If, however, the state should place on private property a
restriction so unreasonable as to deprive the owner of all practical
use of that property, 1 0 such a restriction may be deemed an uncom-
pensated, and therefore unconstitutional, taking of property, notwith-
standing the fact that it promotes the general welfare of the com-
munity.",
There is general agreement among authorities which have con-
sidered the question that zoning or other similar classifications of
property cannot be used as a substitute for eminent domain proceed-
ings'1 2 since to do so is one such unreasonable restriction. Since the
state cannot regulate the use of a specific tract through restrictions
which deny the property owner all reasonable use of his land, the
state has the option of either adopting less restrictive regulations or
taking the land under its power of eminent domain."'
The question arises whether the provisions of the new Mary-
land Wetlands Act, especially those sections dealing with private
wetlands, violate the constitutional mandate against the taking of
property without compensation." 4 If the rules and regulations pro-
scribe the activity proposed by the owner and the owner is refused
a permit to conduct the desired activity, such refusal may result in
an unconstitutional taking if the landowner has been denied the
practical use of his property.
109. See, e.g., Marino v. Mayor & City Council, 215 Md. 206, 137 A.2d 198 (1957).
110. See, e.g., Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n,
218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558 (1958). An unconstitutional taking will also occur when
the property is restricted to uses for which it is not adaptable. See Frankel v. Mayor
& City Council, 223 Md. 97, 104, 162 A.2d 447 (1960).
111. The same result has been reached as to zoning laws which identify their
purposes as ones of conservation. See Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151
Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770, 773 (1964) (flood control); Commissioner of Natural
Resources v. S. Volpe & Co, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965) (involving a
dredge and fill act) ; Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsip-
pany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232, 241 (1963) (swampland preservation).
The following cases have held restrictive conservation legislation to be not
equivalent to a taking: Swisher v. Brown, 157 Colo. 378, 402 P.2d 621 (1965) (a
marketing control act) ; Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Van Zee, 158 N.W.2d 111,
117 (Iowa 1968) (a flood control act); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182
Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83, 89 (1938) (an oil and gas well spacing act). See also Greenleaf
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 260 (1914) (directing removal of
docks in navigable waters, with dissent); Miami Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Dern,
86 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (legislative prohibition of filling submerged land).
112. See I J. METZENBALTM, ZONING 74-79 (2d ed. 1955); 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING
§ 63 (2d ed. 1953). See also Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Roads
Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558 (1958).
113. See Ridden v. Philadelphia, B. & W.R.R., 182 Md. 336, 35 A.2d 99 (1943).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 357A (1967), which provides for the acquisition of interests
in real property for the purpose of preserving open spaces and areas, apparently gives
the State adequate authority to purchase wetland areas. For a discussion of whether
such a "taking" is in fact for a "public use," see CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIVE, supra note 10, at 167-70.
114. Water rights are also protected by the constitutional prohibition against
taking or injuring private property without compensation. See Mayor & City Council
v. Carroll, 128 Md. 68, 96 A. 1076 (1916) (damages to a navigable stream); Mayor &
City Council v. Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co., 104 Md. 485, 65 A. 353 (1906)
(wharfage rights and privileges).
1970]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
A recent case has discussed the issue of uncompensated takings
of wetlands areas. State v. Johnson"5 involved the denial of a permit
required by Maine's Wetlands Act to fill a portion of the appellant's
land. Here the land, absent the addition of fill, had no commercial
value whatsoever. Deciding that denial of the permit to fill so de-
prived the appellant of the reasonable use of his property that it was
constitutionally both an unreasonable exercise of the police power
and an uncompensated taking, the court distinguished conventional
zoning, which is for town protection, from wetlands preservation,
which extends beyond the town and is of statewide concern. The
court held that because these wetlands are "a valuable natural re-
source of the state""' the cost of their preservation should be borne
by the state and not by the landowner. It reasoned that the benefit
to the landowner, as a citizen of the state, which is derived from the
restriction is wholly disproportionate to the burden on him resulting
from deprivation of all reasonable use of his property."1 7
Because of the similarity of the Maine wetland statute to the
new Maryland statute,"" this case is particularly applicable to the
Maryland situation. It suggests that, where a permit is required for
filling and dredging, a strong presumption of an unconstitutional
taking is created when the denial of such a permit leaves a wetland
area virtually devoid of any reasonable uses.
It is interesting to note that nowhere in this decision was the
statute creating the permit system found to be violative of the due
process requirement of the fourteenth amendment. While the specific
permit denial made under the statute was unconstitutional, the stat-
ute itself provided for such procedures, hearings and appeals as to
satisfy the requirements of due process. The Maryland Act appears
to meet these requirements also. But even if its provisions con-
trolling the use of private wetlands are, therefore, not invalid on
115. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
116. Id. at 716.
117. Id. Another recent case, MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 255
N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1970), presented a similar situation. A Massachusetts zoning
enabling law permitted towns to pass by-laws to restrict the uses of marshland in
order to protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens. The Duxbury zoning
law, as interpreted by the county zoning board, prohibited the excavation or filling of
any marsh and authorized special excavation permits for only certain isolated areas
far from the coast. The plaintiff was barred by this interpretation from filling his
marshland and was, therefore, denied any reasonable use of the property while being
left with the burden of paying taxes on it. The court remanded the case to the zoning
board without reaching the issue of uncompensated takings, on the ground that preser-
vation of privately owned land in its natural unspoiled state for the enjoyment and
benefit of the public, by preventing the owner from using it for any practical purpose,
is not within the authority delegated to municipalities under the zoning enabling act.
In dictum, the court suggested several lawful ways, such as acquisition by purchase
or taking by eminent domain, in which the town could preserve its remaining coastal
wetlands in their natural, unspoiled state if it so desired; the inference to be drawn is
that such a restriction of the use of property would be invalid on stronger grounds
than mere statutory interpretation. Cf. Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council, 197
Md. 294, 302, 79 A.2d 367, 370 (1950), where the Maryland Court of Appeals com-
mented on the distinction between restriction and taking: "The only substantial
difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction
leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright con-
fiscation would relieve him of that burden."
.118. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-09 (Supp. 1970) with MD.
ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-31 (Supp. 1970).
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their face, their practical effect may be vitiated. For while they give
the State the statutory authority to deny permits, this power would
be illusory if denial generally resulted in an unconstitutional taking.
The paramount reason for initiating a permit system instead of
a mass condemnation of all wetlands is monetary. If the State can
preserve the wetlands and their ecological benefits through land use
control legislation rather than outright purchase of the areas, a great
saving of public funds will result. Assuming arguendo that the per-
mit system proves ineffectual at preventing dredging and filling on
private wetlands, it at least notifies the State of those wetland areas
for which land reclamation is contemplated, thus alerting the State
as to when and how a specific wetland area is being endangered and
allowing the State either to permit the land reclamation or to con-
demn the wetland by the exercise of eminent domain, thereby pre-
serving it in its natural state. In this way, the State need spend
only a minimum amount of money to protect wetland areas; rather
than purchase all wetlands, the State can accomplish its purpose merely
by purchasing all threatened wetlands.
B. Repeal of the Former Riparian Rights Sections
A problem closely related to that of "takings" and "just com-
pensation" is that of the effect of the new Act's repeal of the former
statutory riparian rights provisions." 9 If these provisions created
property rights, their repeal would violate the notions of due process
since the State would be taking property rights without justly com-
pensating the owner. If the provisions merely created a license, the
State may repeal them without payment of compensation since statu-
tory licenses are inherently revocable or subject to modification at
the pleasure of the legislature. 120 Thus in determining whether there
has been a taking, it is first necessary to identify the nature of the
riparian rights involved; that is, whether they are rights of property
or merely licenses.
There have been a number of cases which have termed the
riparian rights accorded under the Acts of 1745 and 1862 as "fran-
chises" or "quasi" properties 12 ' and spoken of them as "vested."' 2 2
None of these decisions, however, have actually declared these rights
to be property; and they are consistently discussed in terms of some-
thing less than property. There seems to be a great deal more weight
accorded these rights once they have been exercised and improve-
ments have been completed in reliance on them. In Western Mary-
land Tidewater R.R. v. Baltimore, 2 3 for example, the court said of
the riparian's right to improve under the Act of 1862: ". . . until
[the riparian owner] does make the improvements he has no interest
in the land under water on which his land borders, excepting such as
119. See note 92 supra.
120. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.110 (1952).
121. E.g., Mayor & City Council v. Canton Co., 186 Md. 618, 47 A.2d 775 (1946)
Culley v. Hollis, 180 Md. 372, 25 A.2d 196 (1942).
122. 186 Md. 618, 626, 47 A.2d 775, 779 (1946).
123. 106 Md. 561, 68 A. 6 (1907).
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the Act of 1862 or some other statute, if any, may give him."'1 24 The
court in Hodson v. Nelson,'25 on the other hand, took a much stronger
position with respect to these rights once the improvements were
actually completed: "When such improvements are made they be-
come incident to the estate, as not inherently identical in nature with
land, but from being joined to it, and contributing to its uses and
value legally identified with it, as a fixture or a right of way or other
appurtenance that passes with land." '126
The distinction, then, rests on whether the riparian rights
granted under the Act of 1862 have been, in fact, exercised. 27 Once
a riparian landowner has constructed an improvement or induced
an accretion, he appears to acquire under the statutory provision
a property right in that improvement or accretion and cannot be
divested of it by the State without payment of just compensa-
tion. However, it would seem that until that improvement or accre-
tion is made, he merely has a license to make such improvements;
and like any other license it can be revoked before exercised.
To the extent that the former statutory riparian rights are mere
licenses, the State legislature may withdraw them without violating
due process. In accord with this viewpoint is the dictum in Mayor
& City Council v. Canton Co., 2 " where the court said, "We shall
assume, without deciding, that Section 48 could be repealed, and
also Section 47 to the extent that improvements have not actually
been made."' 29
Several other cases have come to substantially the same con-
clusion with respect to sections 47 and 4880 as well as to the right to
dredge accorded by section 485 of article 27.' It clearly appears,
therefore, that the former statutory riparian provisions were not in-
tended as grants of property, but rather are licenses and as such can
be effectively repealed under the new Wetlands Statute.
C. The Public Trust Doctrine
Prior to enactment of the new Wetlands Act, when a riparian
landowner in Maryland extended his littoral boundaries by filling
submerged land (which had, until then, belonged to the State as owner
of the beds of navigable waters) ,12 the very act of completing such
124. Id. at 567. See also Hodson v. Nelson, 122 Md. 330, 89 A. 934 (1914) ; Hess
v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 5 A. 540, 6 A. 673 (1886).
125. 122 Md. 330, 89 A. 934 (1914).
126. Id. at 339, quoting Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 598 (1886).
127. See CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at 148.
128. 186 Md. 618, 47 A.2d 775 (1946).
129. Id. at 625.
130. See, e.g., Garitee v. Mayor & City Council, 53 Md. 422 (1880); Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23 (1875).
131. Speaking of the right to dredge granted by section 485 of article 27, the court
in Smoot Sand & Gravel Co. v. Columbia Granite Dredging Corp., 146 Md. 384, 389,
126 A. 91, 93 (1924) said that the "right conferred by the statute in question is in
the nature of a license or privilege to the riparian owner and those with whom he has
a contract in writing, which may be revoked at any time by the Legislature."
132. See notes 36-74 supra and accompanying text.
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reclamation gave the landowner, by operation of sections 45 and 46
of article 54,133 title to the newly formed areas."' The question arises
when these wetlands are reclaimed whether the State can allow aliena-
tion of property to which it holds title on behalf of its citizenry. More
narrowly submitted, the problem is whether the State legislature can,
as it did by former sections 45 and 46 of article 54, and by present
sections 721 and 722 of article 66C' and section 15A of article
78A,1 36 permit certain landowners to acquire title to land previously
owned by the State. In several jurisdictions there have been attempts
to halt, through the use of a legal theory known as the public trust
doctrine, such controversial conveyancing of state-owned property."'
This theory is based on the notion that the public has the right to
use public land in certain ways and that this right ought to be specially
recognized and protected. The validity of the doctrine and the feasi-
bility of its application have been topics of considerable debate; these
subjects must be dealt with in any discussion of wetlands legislation
in Maryland.
Although the public trust doctrine can be rationalized in a num-
ber of ways, it is best explained in terms of a restraint on legislative
power. 3 ' There are two major viewpoints of the doctrine as applied
to wetlands. The first is generally founded upon the proprietary
notion that submerged public land is owned by all the citizens of the
state, who as individuals possess certain interests in these areas, such as
the rights of fishing and navigation, which the state secures for them
under an implied trust.1"9 As trustee, the state - more specifically,
the state legislature - is subject to certain limitations on its use and
disposal of these lands. Broadly interpreted, the limitations on the
legislature fall into three categories: first, the property must be used
for a public purpose and must be kept available for use by the general
public; second, the property may not be sold for even a fair cash
equivalent; and third, the area must be maintained for particular
133. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
134. This is true only if it is assumed that sections 45 and 46 encompass land
reclamation. See notes 36-74 supra and accompanying text. See also 52 Op. ATT'y
GEN. 324 (1967).
135. See note 98 supra.
136. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
137. For a very comprehensive survey of the scope and application of the public
trust doctrine, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 473 (1970). See also Stone, Public
Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1 WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS 193-202 (R. Clark ed. 1967) ; Parsons, Public and Frivate Rights
in the Foreshore, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 706 (1922); CHESAPEAKE BAY IN LEGAL
PERSPEcTIVE, supra note 10. at 123-27.
138. See, e.g., Martin v Wadell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), where Chief
Justice Taney discusses the early English concept of the trust theory.
139. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), a landmark in
public trust law. Commenting on this decision, Sax, in 68 MicH. L. REv. 473, reiterated
the principle articulated by the Court which has become the central substantive thought
in public trust litigation: "When a state holds a resource which is available for the
free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon
any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to
more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties."
Id. at 490.
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types of uses such as navigation, fishing or recreation. 140 Few courts,
however, have construed the trust doctrine this broadly.14 1
The second concept of the public trust stems from a dichotomy
in the nature of legislative powers with regard to property. 4 2 Begin-
ning with a basic premise of state constitutional law that the state
legislature, as representative of the people, has plenary powers except
as limited by the state or federal constitution, it then becomes neces-
sary to find a restraint on this legislative power in order to create
the trust. The restraint is to be found in the interplay of two cate-
gories of rights which the state possesses - jus privatum and jus
publicum. On the one hand the state, as a proprietor of land, is ac-
corded all the rights and privileges accompanying the ownership of
private property. These rights are collectively known as the jus
privatum. Among these rights is the power of disposition, which
ostensibly gives the state authority to legislatively alienate land as it
sees fit. 4 ' On the other hand, there are certain public rights, the
jus publicum,'" which are inherent in, and inseparable from, the
creation and recognition of sovereignty and which place certain limi-
tations on the state legislature. These rights are implicitly dedicated
to perpetual public use by the state constitution and cannot be de-
stroyed, impaired or surrendered by the legislature. 1 45  If the right
to use tidal waters and their bottoms is part of this jus publicum,
then the legislature may not grant a property right in, or authorize
the use of, this segment of the public domain unless such use is sub-ject to the jus publicurn. From this restraint on the legislature's
plenary power, the trust relationship is formed.
While the public trust question has been raised in Maryland,'4 6
the Maryland Court of Appeals has not as yet sanctioned its validity.
It is questionable whether wetlands and the "public rights" attached
to them are actually embodied within the concept of jus publicum
and thus sacrosanct from legislative infringement. 4 7 Assuming such
inclusion, whether the doctrine will be incorporated into Maryland
common law sometime in the future and, if so, to what extent, should
depend on whether the question is raised in the context of sections
45 and 46 of article 54 or of the new Maryland Wetlands Act.
While the necessity for judicial protection of wetland areas may
have been more compelling under sections 45 and 46 of article 54
since at the time of their enactment there was no administrative body
to protect the public interests, to recognize the public trust doctrine
140. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 473, 477 (1970).
141. Id. at 485-89.
142. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689 (1932),
where the court, in finding that a right of fishery is not part of the jus publicum and,
therefore, can only exist subject to the disposal of the legislature, gives a thorough
analysis of the powers of the legislature with respect to public rights.
143. Id. at 697.
144. For the history and development of the jus publicum theory, see Parsons,
Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, 22 COLUM. L. Rnv. 706, 707-20 (1922).
145. 1 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 10, 36a (1904).
146. See Phipps v. State, 22 Md. 380 (1864) - Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Harr. & J. 195
(Md. 1821).
147. See note 142 supra.
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at this time with respect to areas already reclaimed under those sec-
tions might result in more burdens than benefits. Since any land
reclamation done under these old provisions would have to have been
done before July 1, 1970 (the effective date of the new Act), and
since most of the reclamation was probably accomplished well before
this date, it may be difficult to apply the public trust doctrine to such
reclamations because of the existence of such equitable defenses as
estoppel, laches and limitations. 141 Moreover, application of the doc-
trine so as to void title to the previously reclaimed land would not
result in a benefit to the public; it would be virtually impossible, and
in many instances hardly desirable, to restore Maryland's shore-
lines to their colonial position.
There are several possible methods of applying the public trust
doctrine to the new statute. Since in its strictest form the public trust
doctrine imposes absolute restraints on the legislative power to alienate
state wetlands, it is conceivable that the doctrine could be used to void
the new statutory provisions which concern public wetlands. The argu-
ment that the legislature has exceeded its authority by enacting legis-
lation which permits any activities detrimental to rights of the public,
such as dredging, filling and even the conveying of wetlands, 4 ' is not
completely without merit. However, to void the public wetland pro-
visions of the new statute would merely shift the supervision of the
public's interests from a competent administrative agency to the courts
of the State. The public trust doctrine is merely a judicial technique
to limit legislative power; it would require a great deal of judicial
skill to circumscribe and refine it so as to keep it properly within the
perspective of wetlands management. Judging from the difficulties
which other courts have had in defining the doctrine, it may spawn
too many judicial entanglements to justify its use.' 5 ' Elevating a
theory of uncertain scope and soundness to the status of law to void
concrete legislation, carefully drawn to effect the result most bene-
ficial to the public, does not seem in the best interest of the State.
The decisions of administrative agencies are generally considered
correct unless it can be shown that they have abused their discre-
tion' 5 ' or that the action of the agency is illegal or ultra vires.
152
Thus, the burden of proof when the decision of an administrative
148. In Kerpelman v. Mandel, Chancery No. 8934 (Cir. Ct. Worcester County,
Md., Aug. 31, 1970), the court specifically rejected the contention that the public trust
doctrine is part of the law of Maryland. The court reasoned that since the legislature
has recognized certain riparian rights and has also granted the Board of Public Works
the power to convey State-owned land by enacting section 15 of article 78A of the
Maryland Annotated Code, it has shown an intent not to make the public trust
doctrine a part of the law of Maryland. However, if the premise is accepted that the
public trust doctrine is basically a restraint on legislative power, then legislative intent
is irrelevant. For a further discussion of the public trust concept in Maryland, see
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 473, 502-09 (1970).
149. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A, § 15A (Supp. 1970), which is considered part
of the new wetland legislation.
150. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 473, 486-89 (1970).
151. E.g., Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1946).
152. E.g., Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816 (1956).
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agency is challenged is on the party attacking the decision.' In the
context of the new Wetlands Act, the public trust doctrine could
be recognized and used to shift the burden of proof from the chal-
lenging party to the administrative agency where the party is chal-
lenging the latter's conveyance of public wetlands or its permitting
filling and dredging of them. The theory behind this shift is that
any alienation or use such as filling would be prima facie evidence
of injury to public rights in such areas and that, therefore, the ad-
ministrative agency should have the burden of proving that such
activities were in the public interest. Aside from the logical incon-
sistency inherent in recognizing the doctrine, this narrow application
of the concept would be subject to the same infirmity that would be
present in a broad, substantive use of the doctrine; such application
would undermine the effectiveness of the administrative agency. Since
the new statute provides guidelines for the agencies involved and since
such agencies have (hopefully) expert and competent administrators,
the correctness of their decisions should be presumed unless they
are shown to be clearly and seriously in error. There is no more
compelling need in the case of agencies administering wetlands than
in that of other administrative agencies to deviate from the general
rule that the party challenging the decision of the agency must bear
the burden of proof.
The public trust doctrine could be employed procedurally to give
standing to appeal to those not a party either to a conveyancing of
public wetlands or to an application for a license to dredge or fill such
wetlands. One omission from the new statute is a provision permitting
one who is not a party to a wetland proceeding to appeal a decision
permitting the use or alienation of State wetlands. Likewise, there
is no provision for appeal by such a member of the public of the Sec-
retary's designation of (or, more importantly, the Secretary's failure
to designate) certain areas as private wetlands, nor is there an appeal
provided such person of the Secretary's rules and regulations for
private wetlands. Each of these decisions of the Secretary may be
appealed only by a person "having a recorded interest in land affected
by any such rules and regulations."' 54 Nor is there any provision
for appeal by such a member of the public of the Secretary's grant,
pursuant to sections 726 and 728, of a permit allowing a person to
conduct an activity on a private wetland which is not permitted by
the Secretary's rules and regulations; an appeal of such decision can
be made to the Board of Review, and then to the local circuit court,
only by the applicant for the permit or by the county or municipal
government in which the land is located. 55
The public trust doctrine affords a sound argument for granting
any citizen standing to challenge such administrative decisions. As
a member of the public and thus a shareholder in the jus publicuin,
a citizen of Maryland would have a small but concrete interest in
153. E.g., Montgomery County v. Public Service Comm'n, 203 Md. 70 98 A.2d
657 (1953).
154. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 725 (Supp. 1970).
155. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 727 (Supp. 1970).
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Maryland's wetlands. It would seem that an action of an adminis-
trative agency taken in derogation of this interest would give such
a citizen standing to appeal the agency's decision. Of the proposed
applications of the public trust doctrine in Maryland, this limited use
would be the most beneficial. But again, it would be illogical to
recognize the doctrine but to only allow its limited application.
However, resort to this use of the public trust doctrine may be
unwarranted in light of certain provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act 5 6 and several recent federal decisions regarding the
question of standing. Section 237 of article 41 provides: "Any per-
son aggrieved by any decision or action or failure to act on the part
of the Secretary or any other department or other agency within the
Department of Natural Resources for which an appeal to the board
of review of the Department of Natural Resources is provided by
§ 236 of this article . . . shall be entitled to appeal. . . ." Section 236
provides that "the board shall hear and determine appeals from those
decisions of the Secretary or any departments or other agencies
within the Department of Natural Resources which are subject to
judicial review under § 255 of this article or under any other provi-
sions of law." Thus, for "any person aggrieved" to be able to appeal
under section 237, his appeal must lie within the provisions of sec-
tion 236, which allows only appeals subject to judicial review under
section 255. Section 255 states: "Any party aggrieved by a final de-
cision in a contested case . . . is entitled to judicial review . .. ."
Thus, it seems that a "person aggrieved" under section 237 must be a
"party aggrieved" under section 255 to appeal a decision rendered by
the Department of Natural Resources. Whether an individual citizen
who was not a party to the original action is a "party aggrieved"
under section 255 has not as yet been decided under Maryland law.
Several federal decisions have held in construing various federal
statutes that such an individual can be an "aggrieved" party within
the meaning of those statutes and, therefore, has standing to chal-
lenge a decision of an administrative agency.' 57 Should the Mary-
land Court of Appeals adopt the rationale of these decisions, there
would be no need to resort to the concept of the public trust. But
perhaps the best way to cure the defect in the wetlands statute is to
amend it to specify that members of the public have standing to chal-
lenge the action of a wetland agency where the public interest is at
stake.
IV. CONCLUSION
The status of reclaimed wetlands has to a large extent been
settled by the new Wetlands Act. Although the validity of title
to land created by filling under sections 45 and 46 is still uncertain,
it seems likely that the riparian owner who created fast land prior
156. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 244-56 (1965).
157. E.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970) ; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Pcwer Comm'n,
,354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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to the effective date of the new statute will be able to successfully
uphold his title on the theory that it is either an "accretion" or an
"improvement" within the scope of these two sections.
The new statute goes a long way toward preserving the benefits
of wetlands for future generations. The recognition of Maryland's
wetlands as a valuable natural resource and their protection through
an administrative agency is an important initial step in preventing
despoilation of these ecologically vital areas. The new statute bars
not every use of wetlands but only those imprudent, wasteful and un-
controlled uses that would jeopardize plant and animal life and de-
stroy the ecological function of the wetlands. With proper manage-
ment, some of these areas conceivably could be reclaimed for limited
industrial, commercial and residential purposes without upsetting the
environmental balance.
While the new statute provides guidelines for wetland adminis-
tration, much depends on the nature of rules and regulations yet to
be established.15 Hopefully, these rules and regulations will clarify
the meaning of the statutory language. For example, it should be
explained which "ecological" or "aesthetic" considerations will be
evaluated in making determinations on wetland usage and what de-
gree of "tidal action" is necessary to constitute a parcel of land a
wetland. The promulgation of distinct and comprehensive regulations
at this time should limit uncertainty and minimize litigation in the
future.
Stuart Marshall Salsbury
158. A plan which would remedy many unclear portions of the Act has already
been submitted for approval. See J. Capper, An Implementation Plan for the [Mary-
land] Department of Natural Resources (June 24, 1970).
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